Rohit V.

If Q-comm is your core channel as a D2C brand - odds are your margins are getting squeezed. See it before it’s too late. Back in 2021, If your product showed up on Zepto or Blinkit, you’d screenshot it and send it to your investor group. It was a big deal. It felt like traction. And it still is. It’s a new channel of distribution because just getting listed is an unlock. The logic is simple: be there → get visibility → more orders → more growth. Over the last 18 months, I’ve heard the same thing from multiple founders: Orders are still coming in but the profits? Negative. I don’t blame the platforms. I have massive respect for all of them. They’re doing what they have to - working towards their own profitability. It’s a natural progression. But, this is commonplace. Founders tell me: “I sold ₹2.1 Cr on qcomm last quarter… and ended the month with ₹30L in losses.” “The platform takes 35%. The customer takes the discount and I don’t even get a phone number.” That’s when I realised: Platforms may still drive GMV but they’re eroding contribution margin. And, of course they are. Two have parent companies that have IPO’ed and the 3rd is trying to. They need to protect their own P&Ls. Which means listing fees, steep commissions, visibility charges and discounts every month (because there’s always a festival in India). It’s starting to look like modern trade for the new age. If you’re scaling top-line but bleeding at the unit level, and building low LTV - you’re in trouble. In this new world, most q-comm platforms are have to charge insurgent brands more while FMCG giants get to negotiate 10–15% commissions. Plus, they don’t worry about CAC or customer retention because they already have recall. But, D2C founders pay 30–45% commissions (3x more), spend on ads to stay visible, and still get undercut by someone running a deeper coupon. I think founders will have to step back and ask, “What are we really making per order?” And when early-stage founders ask me — “Should we list on Q-comm?” I say: List. It’s the most powerful channel for sales if you get it right. But, like any channel - it doesn’t work for everyone and everything. Within 3 months take a call. Only if your unit economics are strong enough - continue. Would you list on qcomm today? Have you seen the same? #d2c #fmcg #distribution #qcomm

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PhonePe’s Pincode launch is being celebrated as the next frontier in healthcare delivery but I think it’s a dangerous sign 🚨 ⚠️ Because this ZERO DARK STORE model is irresponsible. You cannot treat healthcare like FMCG and you definitely can’t treat local chemists like mini-warehouses. Without dark stores, here’s what really happens 👇 1. Sourcing inconsistency will break trust at scale 1 out of 4 drugs in India are counterfeit or substandard & many Tier 2 chemists source from unofficial wholesale channels with 0 quality checks. → Imagine someone receiving a substitute for chemotherapy meds. That’s the risk we’re normalizing. 2. Cold chain compliance is not optional and yet, not traceable India already has a massive cold storage gap over 3.2M MT & temperature-sensitive drugs like insulin or biologics can degrade from a single lapse. In a pharmacy-led model, you have no temperature logs or last-mile validation or even an escalation protocol. If you can’t trace it, you can’t trust it. 3. Absence of FIFO Warehouse infra allows for automated inventory rotation based on expiry dates (FIFO: First In, First Out). And in this model, you’re betting that hundreds of 3rd-party stores will suddenly start doing inventory hygiene? Unlikely. Get ready for expired or near-expiry meds. 4. Batch traceability collapses in a decentralized model 69% of Indian pharma players can’t recall products effectively. Now remove centralised tracking too? You’ve created a system where no one knows who got what. 5. This model’s fulfillment logic is not scalable   You expect pharmacies to: Pick meds → Pack safely → Dispatch in 10 min → Coordinate delivery → All without logistics infra or training? And none of them are on performance SLAs. Unless PhonePe is ready to burn through capital with incentive-heavy subsidies, this model collapses the moment demand spikes So while this model might deliver on convenience and speed, what it gives up is trust, traceability, and long-term safety. PS: This might sound harsh but I’d rather say it now than wait till lives are impacted. Because with medicine, there’s no refund button. PPS: If Grofers evolved to Blinkit 3 years ago, aren't we going back in time?

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fleetx.io claims to have grown 4x since its last funding round ($19.4mn) in 2022. It claims to have crossed Rs 100 crore in ARR and serves 2,000+ clients, from industries such as cement, FMCG, mining, transportation, and manufacturing. Notable clients include Ultratech Cement, Adani Group, Unilever, Godrej, Shree Cement, Maersk, and Panasonic.

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DSP Mutual Fund has issued a statement on why it invested in Lenskart's anchor book. "In this specific case, we have trimmed a slower-growing, similarly-expensive position to make room for this investment." DSP Midcap Fund has invested Rs 90 cr - 2.75% of Lenskart's anchor book. Lenskart has raised Rs 3,268 cr from 147 anchor investors, covering 45% of the Rs 7,278 cr IPO.

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🟣 Zepto is utilising every pixel on the screen for generating ad revenue. Is this the right approach for PMs ? Zepto has taken a bold step by transforming the search bar, traditionally a utility-focused component into a dual-purpose tool for user intent & category promotion. Currently, while Blinkit and Swiggy Instamart show a voice search icon, Zepto replaces that with a seasonal CTA: “GRAB IT!” for ice cream & candies. This isn’t just clever design but it’s a monetization play. They're using prime UX real estate to nudge users into high-conversion or sponsored categories. 💡 𝐒𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐭 𝐠𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐭𝐡 𝐡𝐚𝐜𝐤 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐥𝐢𝐩𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐲 𝐬𝐥𝐨𝐩𝐞? 🎯 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐬: 🟢 Revenue-generating UX →Every tap has the potential to drive more GMV or brand deals. 🟢 Seasonal alignment →It gives teams flexibility to plug in timely campaigns (e.g., mangoes in summer, chocolates near Valentine's). 🟢 Micro nudges, macro impact → A tiny prompt near a core action point can change behavior subtly, yet effectively. ⚠️ 𝐁𝐮𝐭 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐝𝐞-𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐬: 🔴 Blurring intent boundaries → Are we helping users or pushing them? 🔴 Trust erosion risk → If overused or perceived as ads, users may feel manipulated. 🔴 Design clutter danger →Core functions risk being diluted if monetization creeps in everywhere. 👀 𝐒𝐨 𝐰𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐮𝐥𝐝 𝐰𝐞 𝐝𝐨 𝐚𝐬 𝐏𝐌𝐬 & 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐝𝐮𝐜𝐭 𝐃𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬? You can ask this question to yourself 👇 🔵 Does this nudge align with what the user wants—or what the business needs? 🔵 Is this additive to the experience, or intrusive? 🔵 Can we monetize without making it feel like monetization? What is your thought ? Smart use of space, or too close to a dark pattern? #UXDesign #ProductManagement #MobileUX #UserExperience #DesignThinking #ProductManager #ProductDesign #UIUX #Design #DarkPattern #QuickCommerce

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Zepto is making ₹83 CRORE every month just from ADS. That's ₹1,000 CRORE annually - without delivering a single package. Turns out quick commerce has quietly become the most powerful advertising channel in 2024. Think about it - when was the last time you opened Blinkit or Zepto? You go in looking for bread, but somehow that new chip flavor catches your eye. You're buying milk, but end up adding that energy drink everyone's talking about. That's not an accident. That's brands paying SERIOUS money to be there exactly when you're ready to buy. Last week, I was talking to the founder of a D2C snack brand. They shifted 40% of their marketing budget from Meta to Blinkit. Why? Because for every ₹100 they spend on quick commerce ads, they make ₹200 back. When I started Finnet Media, brands were obsessed with Instagram reach and Google keywords. Now? They're fighting over quick commerce real estate. Some even paying 30-45% of their revenue just to be visible on these platforms. Because unlike traditional marketing, there's no fighting with SEO, no adapting to algorithm updates, no endless keyword research. Just pure intent-based marketing at the exact moment of purchase. This is how marketing will evolve in the next 5 years Because attention got you noticed. Intent gets you purchased. #marketing #ecommerce #quickcommerce

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What is Cost of Consent under DPDPA? While our engagement with business for DPDPA, one thing clear – when customers are empowered with granular consent and they will be selective while giving consents and that will directly impact topline revenue. As law becomes reality, one question that every business leader should ask is: “What is the true cost (and value) of customer consent?” Consent is no longer a checkbox; it’s a measurable business variable that impacts revenue, trust, and long-term data strategy. Organization has to identify total customer and must have some preliminary data/assumptions on how many and what consents will customer provide. Along with this define revenue inputs like baseline revenue per user and incremental gain from consent (personalization, analytics, cross selling, upselling, partnerships etc). Thereafter, mapping of cost inputs like license fees, maintenance fees and per user operational costs help analyze situation in measurable way. At this stage other specific information might not be available therefore some assumptions around volume of grievance, data rights and associated implementation must be in place. To simplify, calculate total benefits (revenue uplift + TSP monetization) and discover Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) and this will help you derive your Net value of consent: Net Value = Total Benefit − Total Cost If the net value is positive → compliance becomes an enabler, not a burden. If negative → revisit your consent UX, technology model (License/BOT/Build), or data monetization strategy. By quantifying the Cost of Consent, business can plan for their compliance in alignment with business and forecast compliance ROI. Many of companies are exploring license, BOT or self-building models and therefore above will helps them align technology investment with long-term value creation. Done right, privacy compliance can turn in to strategic differentiator. Consent is not just a legal requirement, it’s a data asset with measurable business value and if your business is impacted and concerned about DPDPA, we have built proprietary models, tools and technology to minimize disruption. At Concur - Consent Manager, we help businesses simplify DPDPA compliance through consent-centric frameworks, automation, and strategic advisory, turning privacy into a growth opportunity. Email problems at info@concur.live Happy to talk! #DPDP #Consent #CostCentre #Concur #Compliance #DataPrivacy

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An interesting trend that we have seen accross D2C merchants at Razorpay is the willingness to offer Cash on Delivery(COD) #payment option. In fact COD is still the king in India: - 50% of all e-commerce orders in Tier 1 cities are COD - 70% in Tier 2 cities - 90% in Tier 3 cities A major roadblock is the problem of Return to Origin(RTOs). What is RTO? A lot of times, at the time of delivery of COD orders the #customers refuse to accept the orders and pay. These orders have to returned to the source address. Why would customers not pay for COD orders? These mostly happen when customers place impulsive order(imagine seeing a nice dress on Instagram and placing orders at that time and later realising it was not needed) or putting in incorrect address or unavailable during order delivery or even fraudsters placing COD orders to hinder the #business . This leads to losses like the shipping costs, #opportunity cost of inventory being blocked. The problem is so big that a lot of our merchants would not offer COD or put COD charges to deter customers from placing COD orders. During our conversations we found they would direct the customers to order from Amazon, Flipkart or quick commerce apps like Zepto, Blinkit if they wanted to place COD orders as inventory there is managed by marketplaces. We tried building a solution that solves the problem both for merchants and customers with Partial COD. Using Partial COD, merchants could ask for a small token amount(generally covering the shipping cost) and customers could pay the rest during delivery. This creates a win-win situation for the entire ecosystem. For merchants, it helps them recover their shipping costs. For customers, it is a way to get the benefit of paying through COD. On top of this we have also added a layer of data science and #technology. Over the last few years due to the sheer number of orders that Razorpay processes, we have been able to make a strong #machinelearning model that can accurately predict which order will get RTOed based using the order parameters. So merchants could choose to monetise even the high risk orders(which would have been blocked for COD) by offering Partial COD to just higher risk customers and normal COD to others. We have been scaling this #product since last few months making sure that the feature doesn't hinder the accounting(as this is different from traditional COD) and is compatible with all shipping providers(across merchant there are 30+ shipping providers). The results have been amazing! Accross merchants we have seen ~25% increase in GMV along with a signifcant reduction in RTO. Even a lot of our merchants who had never offered COD before have started to offer COD resulting a significantly higher GMV. #kneeledge

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Two startups. Same market. Same chance. One raised too early. The other was too late. The outcomes will surprise you 👇🏻 Snapdeal→ Raised Funds Too Early Snapdeal initially raised large funds and positioned itself as a leading e-commerce player in India. What they did: Aggressive expansion, diversified offerings, heavy rebranding, and multiple acquisitions. Problems faced: - Execution errors & poor integration of acquisitions - High cash burn and costly decisions - Service failures, delayed deliveries, and eroded customer trust - Fierce competition from Amazon and other well-funded players Result? Growth became unsustainable, financial stress escalated, and Snapdeal lost market share. 📌 Lesson: Raising big too early can drive unfocused growth, operational chaos, and high burn, hurting competitiveness. Byju’s→ Raised Funds Too Late Byju’s prioritized building product quality and acquiring customers organically before raising large funding rounds. What they did: Developed curriculum, improved tech, and scaled cautiously with limited capital. Problems faced: - Slower early growth - Pressure to balance scale with quality - Competitive pressure from better-funded rivals - Later rounds required huge scaling expectations How they overcame it: Focused on unit economics, product innovation, and raised larger rounds later to fuel massive expansion. 📌 Lesson: Late funding slows growth but disciplined focus and strong execution make it highly effective. Timing matters in fundraising. Too early risks scaling before you’re ready. Too late risks missing growth. Make sure your business model is solid and scalable first.” _ _ _ P.S. Want to raise funds to scale your startup? Fill this form and let’s help you become funding-ready👇 https://lnkd.in/gjqKsyb8

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The Platform Paradox: Bistro, Snacc, and the Antitrust Dilemma "When prices went up judges said it was monopoly, when prices went down they said it was predatory pricing, and when they stayed the same they said it was tacit collusion." Ronald Coase's observation perfectly captures the antitrust conundrum now facing Zomato and Swiggy. With Zomato and Swiggy launching private labels Bistro and Snacc respectively for 10-minute food delivery, these platforms have ignited fresh antitrust debates. But crying monopoly prematurely misses crucial nuances of platform economics. Yes, there's an apparent conflict of interest: these aggregators simultaneously serve as delivery partners (charging commissions of 16-30%) while competing directly with restaurants through private labels. They wield significant advantages—proprietary consumer data, zero commission costs, and subsidised delivery fees—allowing them to offer sub-₹200 items with free delivery. Yet traditional antitrust frameworks fail to capture the full picture. Consider: - This move follows Zepto's success with Zepto Café—it represents natural market evolution rather than predatory behaviour. - The delivery platforms have transformed restaurant economics. Home delivery orders average ₹420-430, while dine-in experiences generate an AOV of ₹3,000. Far from cannibalising restaurants, platforms have boosted revenues for the dine-in market segment. What we need isn't hyperbolic predictions of future consumer harm from a monopoly-in-works. We need a Coasian recognition that different firms organise production differently to serve consumer demand. To put things in perspective, let’s take the example of Uber and cab companies. They both ultimately transport people from one location to another via an automobile. How a cab company and Uber actually achieve this objective is quite different— similar services through dramatically different business models. Well, what needs acknowledgement is that platforms constantly evolve their organisational structures, and it is only natural. Effective regulation requires incorporating the realities of multi-sided platforms into antitrust frameworks. The debate shouldn't centre on whether these moves violate traditional antitrust principles but how our regulatory approach must evolve to accommodate platform economics while protecting genuine competition. Antitrust regulations stand at a crossroad; shouldn’t we fundamentally rethink how they apply to modern economies? Let me know in the comments section. For facts of the case, read this ET article: https://lnkd.in/dARXQNsj

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Watch 20+ Startup IPOs in 2025. Closely study those Industries Zappfresh (D2C/Consumer) Zepto (Quick Commerce) Zetwerk (B2B/ Ecommerce) Infra.market (B2B/E-commerce) Innoviti - (Fintech) InCred - (Fintech) Indiqube (Co-working) Ofbusiness (B2B/E-commerce) PhysicsWallah (Edtech) PayU (Fintech) Pine Labs (Fintech) Shadowfax (Logistics) Smartworks (Coworking) To become more abundant follow the Industry closely. Data Source: MoneyControl

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Difference between our smallest client ACV and largest one is 250x. That is the capability growth in past few years at Refrens For pay-as-you-go pricing this is normal but for feature based pricing, this is surprising for me also. The challenge is in growing the team's mindset to sell a 250x product. From few thousand rupees micro saas to few lakhs for mid market systems. Sales people need to go from talking about samosa chutney to cheesecake.

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How India Pays – A Glimpse into Jan 2025 Retail Payment Trends UPI dominates by transaction volume at a whopping 79.6%, yet accounts for 29.2% by value – showing its strength in everyday, high-frequency payments NEFT leads by value at 47.8%, reflecting its stronghold in high-ticket, formal transfers. IMPS and NACH play strategic roles in both value and frequency. Credit Cards (2.2%) and Debit Cards (1.4%) together account for less than 4% of volume, and under 3% of value The former poster boys of “plastic money” seem to have missed the digital disruption. Tied too tightly to legacy revenue models—interchange, interest, and EMI—they failed to evolve with the new-age consumer. In the race toward mobile-first, real-time payments, they didn’t pivot fast enough. This is a classic case of innovation inertia—protecting current business at the cost of future relevance. This isn’t just a shift in tech—it’s a shift in trust. A reminder to all of us in leadership roles: protecting legacy cannot come at the cost of relevance. India is now living in a real-time, contactless, frictionless economy—and it’s UPI that’s leading the way. #DigitalPayments #Fintech #UPI #Innovation #ConsumerBehavior #CreditCard #Disruption #India #RetailPayments #BusinessModel

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