Xiaomi's reinvention: How they adapted to the changing market

This title was summarized by AI from the post below.

https://lnkd.in/eH5KxNgC Excellent, detailed research on Xiaomi reinvention comeback. 1. Lei Jun had mistaken a brilliant strategy for a niche segment to be a universal law in business. The market had moved, rendering their founding position of online-only, low-margin — a fatal constraint  2. Xiaomi assembled an ecosystem of over 210 partner companies (Huami, Ninebot, etc.), where they provided capital, brand, and supply chain muscle. This “planting a garden” strategy ensured customers had multiple, low-friction reasons to return beyond the phone 3. The split of Redmi (value/online) from Mi (premium/retail) allowed Xiaomi to pursue higher selling price and shed the budget-brand perception, while still capturing wallet share 4. The US blacklisting of Huawei in May 2019 created a massive market opportunity globally, particularly in Europe. Xiaomi, having built its capacity ( global supply chain, R&D), was positioned to quickly land and expand in Europe capturing market share and reaching #1 by mid-2021 5. The SU7 car is not a separate product; it is a cool entry point into the unified HyperOS ecosystem. This move locks customers into an ecosystem (similar to Apple) where leaving their phone, smart home, and car means a significant "loss" of convenience. A "rolling Xiaomi device" might be a vulnerability if HyperOS or overall UX lags behind best-in-class, dedicated systems. It is a constant challenge maintaining excellence across Smartphone, AIoT, and EV simultaneously 5. Xiaomi’s reinvention speed was not primarily down to its superior managerial foresight but was only possible because of pre-existing, hyper-efficient supply chain built by Apple and Tesla. It is a high-level case study of success in location-dependent competitive advantage. The ability to pivot across hardware categories (rice cookers to cars) were enabled by this unique, dense, and Apple-trained manufacturing ecosystem. This advantage is non-transferable to Western-market competitors. Their global expansion plans will face escalating risks tied to China's geopolitical standing Consequence of all of this - By Q2 2025, 60.8% of revenue came from non-smartphone businesses, proving the “Triathlon” model was working : low-margin hardware (including cars) driving high-margin internet services.

To view or add a comment, sign in

Explore content categories